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Philosophy and Theology
These philosophy and theology notes focus on two matters of ongoing moral
and public concern, namely, the use of condoms to prevent AIDS and human embryo
ethics. The use of condoms by spouses to prevent the spread of disease is apparently
discussed at the highest levels of the Vatican, though an upcoming document from
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on bioethics, dubbed “Donum vitae II,”
reportedly does not address the matter. However, the remarks of Cardinal Carlo Maria
Martini who, newspapers report, endorses the use of condoms to prevent the spread
of HIV among spouses, have drawn attention to the current debate.
The Morality of Condom Use to Prevent HIV Transmission
In an article in The Thomist titled “The Morality of Condom Use by HIVI nfected Spouses” (January 2006), Janet Smith, author of Humanae Vitae: A Generation Later and many other works, addresses this issue at the scholarly level. She
offers a critique of the work of Rev. Martin Rhonheimer, who holds that condom use
by an HIV-infected spouse to prevent the transmission of HIV is not intrinsically evil,
although it may be wrong on prudential grounds.1 He believes that the contraceptive
effect of the condom is not primarily intended; preventing transmission of a lethal
disease is the intention. Rhonheimer’s view has prompted a number of responses,2
but perhaps the most thorough to date is the one Smith offers.

1
Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., and Rev. Martin Rhonheimer, “On the Use of Condoms to
Prevent Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly
5.1 (Spring 2005): 40–48.
2
William May, “Colloquy—Using Condoms to Prevent HIV,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 4.4 (Winter 2004): 667–668; Guevin, “On the Use of Condoms,” 37–39;
Peter J. Cataldo, “Condoms and HIV Prevention: Thwarting the Procreative End,” Ethics
& Medics 30.5 (May 2005): 3–4; Luke Gormally, “Marriage and the Prophylactic Use of
Condoms,” National Catholics Bioethics Quarterly 5.4 (Winter 2005): 735–749.
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Smith argues that the Church’s teaching on contraception may not be the key
consideration in this issue. If only completed acts of sexual intercourse are moral
(i.e., those “apt for generation”), then the use of a condom renders the act of sexual
intercourse incomplete and no self-giving takes place. She notes that couples in
which one spouse has HIV need not abstain for the rest of their marriage, but may
consider the risk of transmitting HIV acceptable. Smith’s argument that only sexual
acts apt for generation are morally permissible rests on philosophical, theological,
and canon law grounds. She argues that condom use by spouses is intrinsically immoral because it violates the unitive meaning of the sexual act and that “condom
use by fertile heterosexuals always retains a contraceptive meaning, even when
done to reduce the risk of transmitting disease.” She also considers the morality of
condom use by same-sex couples, heterosexual couples who engage in premarital
sex, and prostitutes.
Smith’s arguments are especially interesting because they venture to answer
many questions of sexual ethics that Humanae vitae and other Church documents
do not explicitly address. Does the morality of contraception remain the same
regardless of the marital status of the couple? (Cambridge philosopher Elizabeth
Anscombe famously held that contraception was worse when practiced by a husband
and wife than by an unmarried couple.) Would condom use by a same-sex couple
add “another immoral element to the intrinsic evil of a homosexual act?” What kind
of sexual acts consummate a marriage? 3
In the end, Smith’s argument requires greater consistency in Church teaching
and practice. It seems to be commonly accepted among moralists that in a case
where, for example, a husband uses contraception, including barrier methods, the
wife does not have a duty to refuse intercourse despite the contraceptive use of the
husband. However, if condom use during sex is intrinsically evil, then it would seem
that there is a duty always to refuse such intercourse. In other words, the following
propositions would seem to be inconsistent: If a husband uses a condom to prevent
his wife from getting pregnant, she may have sex with him. If he uses the condom
to reduce the likelihood of transmitting a disease, she may not have sex with him.
Either condom use during sexual intercourse is intrinsically evil, in which case she
should refuse intercourse in both situations, or it is not intrinsically evil, in which
case she has no absolute moral duty to refuse in either situation.
Does the Rhythm Method Cause Embryonic Death?
With respect to embryo ethics, two recent articles merit special consideration.
First, in “The Rhythm Method and Embryonic Death” (Journal of Medical Ethics,
June 2006), Luc Bovens argues that those who view IUDs, contraceptive pills, and
“morning after” pills as morally problematic because they can act as abortifacients
and cause embryonic death, should be equally if not more concerned about the
“rhythm method,” which, he argues, causes even more embryonic deaths. Bovens’s
argument is based on three assumptions:
Also of interest on this point is Urbano Navarrete, S.J.,“On the CDF Decree on Male
Impotence,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 6.4 (Winter 2006): 733–754.
3
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The first assumption is that there are a great number of conceptions that never
result in missed menses. There are estimates that only 50% of conceptions
actually lead to pregnancies. The second assumption is that, even in clinical
trials, the rhythm method can fail due to the fact that a pregnancy results from
sexual intercourse on the last days before and the first days after the prescribed
abstinence period. Estimates of the effectiveness of the rhythm method vary in
the literature, but let us set its effectiveness for clinical trials at 90%—that is,
conscientious rhythm method users can expect one pregnancy in ten womanyears. The third assumption is that there is a greater chance that a conception
will lead to a viable embryo if it occurs in the center interval of the fertile period
than if it occurs on the tail ends of the fertile period.

Taking these assumptions together, Bovens argues that those who are concerned about
the loss of embryonic life should not only avoid using IUDs, contraceptive pills, and
“morning after” pills, but should also not use the rhythm method. The real message of
the article is in the last line, “One could simply conceive of this whole argument as a
reductio ad absurdum of the cornerstone of the argument of the pro-life movement,
namely that deaths of early embryos are a matter of grave concern.”
To critique a relatively minor point, it is unfortunate that Bovens speaks of
the “rhythm method” rather than natural family planning (NFP) or fertility awareness. Over the last forty years, informed authors rightly distinguished between NFP
and the rhythm method in terms of method effectiveness in achieving or avoiding
pregnancy, since the rhythm method attempts to determine fertility in the present cycle
via projections from the previous cycle, whereas NFP looks for signs of fertility in
the current cycle.
More importantly, Bovens’ article provides no empirical evidence for the first and
third assumptions of the argument. In letters to the editor of the Journal of Medical
Ethics, many writers, most notably Joan Clements, editor of Ovulation Method
Research and Reference, point out numerous studies that contradict the assumptions
on which Bovens’s article rests.
Alexander Pruss, a philosopher now at Baylor University, provides an alternative critique. He argues that
Now in a case where uncontracepted sexual intercourse at a given time leads to a
failure of implantation, a single act—intercourse—causes a human being to exist
and to exist under conditions that make it impossible for the human being to survive
more than about two weeks. But there is only one action here, and a fairly direct result of this action is conception. It is simply that the conceived child is, we assume,
certain to die within about two weeks. The couple is not directly responsible for
the death, since the couple did not create the conditions inhospitable to implantation. Furthermore, nobody is wronged by this act. For the child conceived at this
point in time, call the time A, would not have come into existence had the couple
abstained from the intercourse. Of course, if the couple engaged in intercourse at
a different time, call it B, then perhaps the child conceived then would have lived
longer. But that would have been a different child. By having intercourse at time
A rather than at B, the couple is not wronging the child they are conceiving, since
that child is not worse off for being conceived and living for two weeks than for not
being conceived at all. Nor are they wronging the child they would have conceived
at time B, since one cannot wrong someone who never exists. Moreover, there
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is no action the couple could have done to give the child who actually comes to
exist a chance to live a longer life. No one has been wronged.4

In a letter to the editor, Bovens has responded both to the empirical and philosophical
critiques, but critics have registered still further objections to his provocative and
deeply dubious article.
One further consideration is that an agent’s responsibility for negative unintended
effects varies according to whether the agent’s action is otherwise morally permissible.
If the agent does something that is morally wrong, then the agent’s moral responsibility for negative side effects differs from cases in which an agent does something
morally right and negative effects follow. Ethically and legally, the case of a person
who accidentally injures or kills someone in the course of committing a crime differs
from that of the person who accidentally injures or kills someone while acting in an
otherwise permissible way . Therefore, if contraception is wrong and if NFP is morally
permissible on other grounds, even if they both cause embryonic deaths, the moral
responsibility involved for these deaths would not be the same.
Licitness of Embryo Adoption
The second article that discusses the topic of embryo ethics is “An Argument for the
Embryonic Intactness of Marriage,” by Stephen Long in The Thomist (April 2006). Long
argues that heterologous embryo transfer (HET)—also called “embryo adoption”—is
morally wrong. Since Donum vitae condemns surrogacy, it can also be used as a basis
to condemn embryo adoption, because “deliberately placing a child not conceived with
one’s husband into one’s womb is to be a surrogate mother.” In the manner of Aquinas,
Long raises nine prima facie considerations that one could argue in favor of the moral
permissibility of embryo adoption: (1) a “physicalism” argument, i.e., “the moral species
of one’s action is not determined simply by the physical nature of one’s action”; (2) the
argument that the immorality of splitting genetic from gestational motherhood has already
occurred; (3) if the education of children and breastfeeding may be done by another, so also
can gestation of the child; (4) a condemnation of HET would seem to require intentional
abortion in such cases; (5) carrying a child is not integrally necessary to the procreative
end; (6) “even if carrying a child is integrally necessary to the procreative end, it does not
follow that it belongs to the couple as couple and to no one else”; (7) technology alters
what is “naturally” possible; (8) HET is more “natural” than to allow embryonic deaths
or use artificial wombs; and (9) the “lesser of two evils” argument. The last section of his
article seeks to answer all nine objections, and for the most part answers them well.
Long’s article should be required reading on the HET debate, but the conclusion
that embryo adoption is intrinsically evil has not yet, in my opinion, been secured
through his arguments. First, while it is true that Donum vitae clearly condemns
surrogacy, surrogacy should not be understood to include HET. In both definitions of
surrogacy offered in Donum vitae, it is defined as “a pledge to surrender the child once
it is born to the party who commissioned or made the agreement for the pregnancy”
(II, 3). However, at least in the typical case of embryo adoption, the gestational mother
Alexander Pruss, “We All Have a Finite Life Span,” letter, JME Online, June 26,
2006. Pruss’s critique, as well as other correspondence about the Bovens article, is available
at http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/32/6/355#575
4
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does not make a pledge to surrender the child once it is born but rather intends to
raise the child as her own.5 In other words, cases of HET do not (at least normally)
involve any agreement with those who commission the pregnancy nor do they
involve (at least normally) a pledge to surrender the child once it is born. Indeed,
embryo adoption more closely approximates the ideal of integrative parenthood
championed in Donum vitae than does adoption after birth, for in embryo adoption
the same woman is the gestational and social mother, whereas in a typical adoption
the woman who raises the child does not gestate the baby.
Long’s argument is not simply derived from the authority of Donun vitae,
but rests on a rich conception of the normativity of natural teleology. He writes,
“just as the acts leading up to and including conception are rightfully those of the
spouses as spouses, so the bearing of the child, which is integrally necessary to the
procreative purpose, belongs rightfully only to the spouses as spouses and to no
one else.” Long understands the procreative end to include not only conception but
also the birth of a live child, “The bearing of the child in the womb by the mother
is naturally and normatively necessary to the end of a live child, and so that which
generically pertains to the procreative good belongs to it insofar as it is integrally
necessary to the procreative good.”
Biologically speaking, however, the bearing of the child in the womb by the
biological mother is not necessary to the end of a live child. Cases of HET have
been successful; thus, it is not naturally necessary, in the biological sense, that
the biological mother be the gestational mother. Since precisely the issue at hand
is whether it is normatively necessary that a woman nourish her own biological
offspring in her own womb, I do not see how this consideration can function as a
premise without begging the question.
Long’s argument hinges in part on his understanding of the integral purpose of
procreation:
If it is said that such “adoption” [HET] is not procreative, because procreation is
only “conception,” this has been answered above: under natural law the integral
purpose of procreation is the delivery of a live rather than a dead child. Hence
childbearing is integrally necessary to procreation, and belongs, as does all that is essential to the natural procreative end, to the couple as couple and to none other.

In this view, shared also in different terms by others,6 procreation properly understood
includes gestation, so those who choose HET separate the procreative act from the unitive
act of sexual intercourse, much the same as do those who practice IVF.
I will not address the important question of whether a woman who adopts an embryo
may decide to place the child for adoption after birth. In other words, I do not address here the
permissibility of splitting what might be called “gestational motherhood” from “social motherhood.” For more about this question, see E. Christian Brugger, “In Defense of Transferring
Heterologous Embryos” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5.1 (Spring 2005): 109–111.
5

Rev. Tadeusz Pacholczyk, “Examining Some Objections to Heterologous Transfer of
‘Abandoned’ Embryos,” presentation at The Westchester Institute Scholars Forum, Washington, D.C., October 28–29, 2004, cited by E. Christian Brugger, “In Defense of Transferring
Heterologous Embryos,” 97.
6
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Although writing prior to publication of Long’s work, Christian Brugger has
indicated several challenges for an expanded understanding of procreation.7 The view
advocated by Long seems to be in some tension with the idea that a new human being
comes into existence when fertilization is complete. When there is a new human
being, procreation, strictly speaking, has already taken place. If procreation lasts
throughout gestation, then abortion does not really kill an innocent human being.
Gestation is a period of development of the human child, which implies that the
human being already exists, and hence procreation has been completed.
If we understand procreation in a broader sense to include all that is essential to
the natural procreative end, then it is unclear why “procreation” (which initiates human
development toward maturity) should be said to end at birth, for the process of human
development continues during infancy and beyond. Parents whose child dies just a few
days after birth equally fail to achieve the procreative end (in the broader sense) as those
whose child dies just before birth. In other words, it is unclear why “live birth” is the
determinate line that circumscribes the procreative end understood in the broad sense.
Without this line, if we adopt the broader definition of procreation, the exclusive reservation of procreation to married couples would seem to exclude not only embryo adoption
but adoption of a child prior to birth (during gestation) as well as adoption after birth.
I believe it is more accurate to understand the gestation of a child as an “educational”
end, which of course does not merely include formal education, but (arguably) in the
original sense of the term “leading” the underdeveloped human being toward physical
and spiritual maturity. Although ideally the education of the human being should be
undertaken by the biological parents, in cases where these parents are unable or unwilling
to undertake responsibility for the growth and development of a human being toward
maturity, this responsibility may be accepted by adoptive parents.
Long makes an interesting and original observation: “For a religious woman
to choose to implant in her womb an embryonic human being is a violation of her
profession of perpetual chastity, by which she turns away from the fecundity of the
flesh in the blessings of marriage for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven.” I think
one can intuit that embryo adoption is inappropriate for the professed religious and
yet not condemn all instances of HET. Religious men and women pledge to achieve
fruitfulness in the community that is not tied to normal family structures, so any
kind of adoption would be inconsistent with their vows. Additionally, for religious
women, if they were to undertake HET, many people would falsely assume that they
had sexual intercourse and had thereby broken their vows. However, neither of these
considerations excludes the use of HET by married couples seeking to make the
best of a broken situation, just as couples have for centuries in generously adopting
children after birth.
						
Christopher Kaczor, Ph.D.
Robert H. Taylor S.J. Chair in Philosophy
Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, California
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Brugger, “In Defense of Transferring Heterologous Embryos,” 95–112.

